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Essay 
~on Hate and Equality 
Alon Harer and Gideon Pa:rchomovskytt 
Bias crime legislation-or, as it is sometimes called , hate crime 
legislation- enhances the punishment of crimes that are carried out because 
of the victim ' s race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation. Since its 
inception, bias crime legislation has sparked substantial political 
controversy and scholarly discussion . This debate was recently rekindled by 
the horrendous murder of Matthew Shepard, which shocked our society and 
prompted President Clinton to speak to the issue in this year ' s State of the 
Union Address.1 The academic community, however, remains deeply 
divided over the need for and desirability of such legislation.2 
The disagreement about bias crime is due in large part to the fact that 
existing justifications for bias crime legislation proceed from the premise 
that the rationale supporting bias crime legislation must be found either in 
t Seni or Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University ; Visiting Professor, Columbia Law 
School ( 1998-1 999). 
tt Associ ate Professor, Fordham Uni versity School of Law. Thi s essay benefited greatly from 
comments by Dav id Alexander, Avi Bell , Brian Bix, Russell Chti stopher, Sherry Colb , Michael 
Dorf, George Fletcher, Assaf Hamdani, Doron Kalir, Peter Kougasian, Dan Richman, Steve 
Shepard, Peter Siegelman, Kenneth Simons, Joseph Raz, and Ben Zipursky. 
1. " Discrimination or violence because of race or religion, ancestry or gender, disabili ty or 
sexual orientation, is wrong, and it ought to be illegal. Therefore, I ask Congress to make the 
'Employment Non-Discrimination Act' and the 'Hate Crimes Prevention Act' the law of the 
land." Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Uni on, 35 W EEKLy 
COM P. PRES. Doc. 78,87 (Jan. 19, 1999). 
2. Compare Susan Gellman, Sticks and Srones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words Increase 
Your Senrence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. 
REV . 333 , 358-79 ( 199 1) (arguing that penalty-enhancement statutes violate the Firs t 
Amendment), with Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystel)' of Motive. Private and Public: Some Not es 
In spired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REv . I , 35 (" [T]he 
motive underlying-as opposed to the message expressed by--either public or private conduct 
quite often is a legitimate fac tor to consider in deciding how our polity should treat that 
conduct. " ). 
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the greater gravity of the wrongdoing involved in such crimes or m the 
perpetrator's greater degree of culpability .3 Advocates of bias crime 
legislation strive to demonstrate that bias crimes are more wrongful than 
identical crimes not motivated by bias,4 or that bias crimes implicate a 
greater degree of culpability on the part of the perpetrator of the crime.5 
Equally committed to this premise, opponents of bias crime legislation 
purport to show that bias crimes are not more wrongful than identical 
crimes not motivated by hate and that they do not involve greater 
cul pability on the part of the perpetrator.6 Thus, the discussion of the 
desirability and necessity of bias crime legislation has foc used almost 
exclusively on the wrongfulness of the act and on the moral 
blameworthiness of the perpetrator of the crime, assuming that these 
constitute the only grounds upon which penalty enhancement for bias 
crimes can be justified. 
This premise is grounded in a more comprehensive theory that 
dominates the non-utilitarian discourse of criminal law-that the 
only two grounds that may justify disparate treatment of offenses 
in the context of criminal law are the wrongfulness of the act or the 
culpability of the perpetrator.7 Despite its semblance of fairness, this 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is heavily biased in favor of criminal 
offenders. Because the criminal offender controls, to a large extent, both her 
conduct and her mental state, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm 
confers upon the criminal offender the power to dictate the content of 
criminal prohibitions and the sanctions imposed for violating them. The 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm assigns no independent importance to 
the crime victim. Under this paradigm, the harm to the victim is merely one 
factor out of many that may affect the wrongfulness of the act. 
3. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN 
LAW 161-75 (1999) (arguing that bias crimes ought to be punished more severely than parallel 
crimes because of the greater harm caused and the greater culpability of the criminal); Anthony 
M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime 
Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1997) ("[T]he penalties imposed by a criminal justice 
system, at a minimum, must be deserved by those they are inflicted on and ... desert, in tum, is a 
function of (1) the gravity of the wrongdoing involved and (2) the wrongdoer's degree of 
culpability for that wrongdoing."). 
4. See LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing that bias c1imes are more wrongful than 
otherwise motivated crimes because of their impact on the individual victim, her community, and 
society at large). 
5. See id. at 58-61 (discussing the centrality of the concept of culpability to criminal law and 
arguing that perpetrators of bias crimes have greater culpability than those of parallel crimes). 
6. See Dillof, supra note 3, at 1036-80 (rebutting the claims that hate crimes are more 
wrongful and that the perpetrators of hate crimes are more culpable). 
7. See, e.g., R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 103 (1990); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§§ 6.6 to 6.6.1, at 454-59 (1978); ROBERT 
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97 (1981); Michael S. Moore, The Independent 
Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 237-38 (1994). 
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Thi s Essay challenges thi s paradigm and proposes an alternati ve theory 
in support of bias crime legislation. The primary tlaw of the wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm is the exclusi ve role it assigns to factors that are 
intrinsic to the criminal encounter in determining the content of the 
prohibitions of criminal law and the severity of its sanctions. It neglects, 
therefore, broad societal concerns that are extrinsic to the criminal 
encounter, such as the relative vulnerabi lity of potential crime victims and 
their likelihood of being attacked. Furthermore , it completely ignores 
society's duty to provide equal protection from crime to different potenti al 
victims. This limited prism allows the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm to 
take into account the actual harm inflicted on crime victims, but it precludes 
it from considering the rel ative vulnerability to crime of various victims in 
determining criminal punishment. Hence, the wrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm provides no basis fo r fa ir di stribution of protection against crime 
to various potential victims. 
The inability of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm to give 
sufficient weight to the interests of victims calls into question its dominance 
in criminal law theory. By challenging the exclusivity of the wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm, this Essay challenges some of the conventional 
normative foundations that underlie discourse about criminal law. 
Specifically, this Essay argues that acknowledging the role of the victim is 
essential in understanding bias crime legislation and its normative roots. To 
accommodate broader societal concerns, the Essay develops an alternative 
to the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, which we call the "fair 
protection paradigm." The fair protection paradigm is predicated on the 
proposition that the criminal law is a principal means by which society 
provides protection against crime to potential victims. On this view, 
protection against crime is a good produced by the criminal justice system, 
which, like many other state-produced goods, should be distributed in an 
egalitarian manner.8 Accordingly, the fair protection paradigm requires the 
state to take into account disparities among individuals in vulnerability to 
crime when determining their entitlement to protection. Thus, under the fair 
protection paradigm, victims who are particularly vulnerable to crime may 
have a legitimate claim on fairness grounds to greater protection against 
crime. Bias crime legislation, on this view, is aimed at protecting 
individuals who are particularly vulnerable to crime because of prevailing 
prejudices against them. 
An individual's vulnerability to crime can be defined as the expected 
harm from crime for that individual-that is, the probability of harm 
multiplied by its magnitude. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable to 
8. See Alon Hare!, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law 
Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1181 , 1200-08 (1994). 
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crime fo:: two different reasons : a greater sensitivity to harm and a greater 
likelihood of becoming a victim. Individual s 'vVho fall into the forrn er 
category may be labeled "extra-sensitive victims ," and ind ividuals who 
belong to the latter may be called" high-risk victims ." 
A state may address the problem of vulnerable victims in one of two 
ways. First, it may impose harsher sanctions on those who commit crimes 
against vulnerable victims. Second, it may devote more resources to 
identifying and prosecuting individuals who attack such victims. While 
both strategies are likely to discourage attacks on vulnerable victims and 
thereby to provide them with greater protection , the latter strategy may 
sometimes be infeasible or too costly. Therefore , equali zing protection 
through the imposition of harsher sanctions may sometimes be the only way 
by which the state can provide vulnerable victims with more protection and 
consequently equalize their vulnerability to that of other potential victims. 
Yet the principle of equalizing protection against crime should be 
constrained in certain ways. The fair distribution of protection does not 
require absolute equality of the expected costs of crime. Under a radical 
interpretation , equal protection against c1ime might be understood to 
require the state to equalize the expected costs of crime for all potential 
victims. This view of equality would imply a duty on the part of the state to 
address any vulnerability to crime, regardless of its source or reason, and to 
place all of its citizens on equal footing in terms of their exposure to c1ime. 
But such a radically egalitarian view cannot provide a solid basis for 
understanding the nature of criminal law; nor can it be morally justified. 
Vulnerability to crime is a function of myriad factors such as wealth, age, 
attitude toward risk, life experience, and physical and intellectual prowess. 
Not all of these factors should be taken into account by the state. Some 
disparities in the vulnerability to crime depend on the investment in 
precautions by the victim herself. Other disparities may be grounded in luck 
and other factors that do not mandate interference by the state. The state 
cannot be reasonably expected to annul all of the disparities in the 
vulnerability of different potential victims of crime. 
The implausibility of the radical egalitarian view should not, however, 
prod one to endorse the radically inegalitarian view, namely, the view that 
the state should be blind to differences in vulnerability among victims. In 
fact, the state's failure to redress some of the differences in the expected 
costs of crime among different potential victims is intolerable and unjust. 
This Essay argues, therefore, for an intermediate position, one which 
requires the state to annul certain disparities in the vulnerability of different 
victims while allowing other disparities to remain. More specifically, we 
take the position that, at a minimum, a liberal state must redress disparities 
in vulnerability to crime that result from certain immutable personal 
characteristics of the victim. 
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The duty of the state to ann ul differences in vulnerabili ty among 
d l ~lerent potential victirr1s does not depend on the !Tiagrj tude uf the 
disparity in the vulnerabi lity of different victims, but rather on the reasons 
underlying the greater vulnerab ility of some victims. Thus, even slight 
differences in vulnerability att ributable to racial facto rs may justify 
puni shment-enhancing legislati on, whiie greater differences attributable, for 
instance, to the victim's choices requi re no action on the part of the state. 
Tc be sure, opponents of bias crime legislation may criticize our 
analysi s on the ground that di stributive justice theories, like the one we 
proffer, are alien to criminal law. But such ctiticism would be misguided. In 
fact, the" fair protection paradigm" provides a theoretical basis for rr..any of 
the doctrines of criminal law, and its explanatory power ranges beyond the 
context of bias crimes. The fa ir protection paradigm can explain, for 
instance, why crimes directed against extra-sensitive victims are often 
punished more severely than crimes directed agai nst less vulnerable ones . 
Properly understood, therefore, bias crime legislation is part of a larger 
scheme of providing fair protecti on against crime. Recognizing the interest 
of victims makes it clear that bias crime legislation is consonant with the 
goals of criminal law. Bias crime legislation is merely one essential step 
toward a more egalitarian provision of protection against crime-a step that 
coheres with the broader goals of the criminal law system. 
This Essay consists of three Parts. Part I explores traditional 
justifications for bias crime legislation-in particular, those that rest on the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. It demonstrates that the wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm fails to provide an adequate justification for bias-
crime legislation. Part II develops the fair protection paradigm. It illustrates 
that the principle of fair protection is not merely normatively compelling, 
but also provides a powerful justification for otherwise inexplicable 
sentencing practices. Part III applies the fair protection paradigm to bias-
crime legislation and demonstrates that the fair protection paradigm can 
explain the contemporary logic underlying bias crime legislation. 
I. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BIAS CRIME LEGISLATION: 
THE WRONGFULNESS-CULPABILITY FRAMEWORK 
As a mle, criminal law disregards motives. Criminal law regulates 
conduct by punishing socially undesirable behavior. The severity of the 
punishment is calibrated to the undesirability of the behavior; motives are 
largely irrelevant.9 Bias crime laws constitute an important exception to the 
9. See WAYNE R. L AFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, J R. , CRIMINAL LAW § 3.6, at 227 (2d ed. 
1986) (" [M]otive, if narrowly defined to exclude recognized defenses and the 'specific intent' 
requirements of some crimes, is not relevant on the substantive side of the criminal law." ); Martin 
R. ·Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Obse1vations on the Role of .i\l!orive in the Criminal Law Past 
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general rule. The motive of the perpetrator is the focal point of bias crime 
Jaws . Unlike mher crimina l legi slation , bias crimes enhance the punishment 
of ordinary crimes that have been motivated by a racial, ethnic , sexuaL or 
religious prejudice. The departure of bias crime laws from the general 
scheme of criminal law calls for justification. After all , it is not se lf-evident 
that an assault motivated by prejudice is worse than an assault otherwise 
motivated. Yet, the former, being a bias crime, may be punished two or 
three times more severely .10 
Various rationales have been proffered to justify bias crime laws. The 
most frequentl y in voked rationales for bias crime laws focus either on the 
cu lpability of bias crime offenders or on the wrongfulness of the act as 
reflected in its impact on the victim and third parties. 11 While these 
rationales are not based on a single theory or principle, they share the 
premise that the distinctiveness of bias crimes inheres in the very nature of 
the acts-be it their moral culpability or their impact. 
This Part presents the arguments in favor of bias crime legislation in 
greater detail , examines them critically, and explains why they fail to 
provide an adequate theoretical foundation for bias crime legislation. 
Section A explores the claim that perpetrators of bias crimes are more 
culpable than perpetrators of similar crimes who are not motivated by 
hatred. Section B evaluates the claim that bias crimes are more wrongful 
than other crimes, either because they impose greater harms on their victims 
or because of the special harms that they impose on third parties. Section C 
critically examines the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm's traditional 
justification for bias crime legislation. 
A. The Greater Culpability Justification 
Culpability has always been a key element in our system of criminal 
law. In determining punishment, criminal law often does not confine itself 
to conduct; it considers moral blameworthiness as well. 12 Identical unlawful 
and Present, 1993 UTAH L REV. 635 (contending that motives do not and should not play a role 
at the level of offense definition in criminal law and that they are only relevant for asserting 
defenses). 
10. See l AMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTIER, HATE CRIMES 147 (1998). But see D.C. 
CODE . ANN. § 22-4003 (1981 & Supp. 1999) (authorizing the court to sentence a bias crime 
offender to no more than one and one-half times the maximum imprisonment and fine allowed by 
the underlying offense). 
1 L See Dillof, supra note 3, at 1019. 
12. American criminal law is based on the principle of blameworthiness or culpability. 
Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code provides general rules of criminal liability by creati ng four 
mental states that represent four degrees of culpability: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and 
negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Its drafter 
explained that "only four concepts are needed to prescribe the minimal requirements and Jay the 
basis for distinctions that may use fully be drawn." Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal 
Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L REV. 1425, 1436 (1968). Thi s 
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acts may carry radically divergent punishments due to the culpability of 
their perpetrators . For example, the punishme nts of homicide offenders 
vary dramatically depending upon whether they acted negligently, 
reckless ly, know ingly, or intentionally. Consequently , proponents of bias 
crime laws argue that offenders who act out of hate or prejudice are more 
blameworthy than otherwise motivated offenders and therefore deserve 
more severe punishment. 13 On this view, crimes motivated by prejudice are, 
by their very nature , morall y worse than similar crimes not motivated by 
prejudice, and the punishment for such crimes must retlect their heinous 
nature. 
The weakness of this justifi cation is that it depends on the prem ise that 
prejudice is more morally reprehensible than all other criminal motives. But 
this pre mise does not withstand scrutiny. Unlike mens rea, motives cannot 
be readily ranked by their degree of culpability. While no one disputes that 
a defendant who intentionally killed a person is more blameworthy than a 
defendant who negligently brought about the same res ul t, and should 
therefore be punished more severely , many would question the proposition 
that an offender moti vated by prejudice is more cu lpable than one 
motivated by greed, spite, or pure sadism. 14 Indeed, it is not at all clear that 
a racially motivated assault is more morally reprehensible than an assault 
on an elderly person in order to steal her subsi stence allowance. The reason 
why people have differing views regarding the culpability of various 
criminal motives is that, at some level, motives appear to be 
incommensurable. As Jeffrie Murphy suggests, "[P]erhaps almost all 
assaults, whether racially motivated or not, involve motives of humiliation 
and are thus evil to the same degree." 15 At the end of the day , the project of 
correlating motives to moral culpability seems hopelessly unfruitful, and, 
consequently, so is the attempt to justify bias crime legislation on the 
ground that bias-motivated offenses are morally worse than all other 
offenses .16 
articulation of the mens rea requirement is its most important achievement. See Paul H. Robinson, 
A Brief HistOI)' of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J . 815, 815-21 ( 1980) 
(describing the distinctions among the Code's culpability te rms and their importance). Moreover, 
section 2.02 may be considered representative of the modem American culpability scheme, as it 
exerted a major influence on criminal law reform in 36 of the 38 jurisdictions where reform has 
occuned since its fmmulation. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in 
Defining Criminal Liability: The lv!odel Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 68 1, 691-92 
( 1983). 
13. See, e.g., Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just ? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992-
1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485,491-94. 
14. See, e.g., JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 80. 
15. Jeffri e G. Murphy , Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Desen1e ?, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23 
(1992) . 
16. For more general arguments against cu lpabili ty theory, see Dillof, supra note 3, at 1063-
80. 
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B. Th e Greoter Wrong Justificotion 
I. Greoter Wrong to the Victim 
One of the more influential arguments for bias crime legislation is that 
bias crimes are more harmful to the victim. Citing thi s principle, proponents 
of bias crime laws have asserted that bias crimes con sistently inflict a more 
severe harm on the victim and thus are more wrongful than otherwise 
similar crimes .17 There are three types of arguments that fall into this 
category: the greater physical harm, the greater mental harm, and the 
discriminatory treatment. 
It is often argued that bias crimes tend to be excessively brutaL 1 ~ 
Despite its popularity, the "excess ive brutality" justif ication suffers from 
two major tlaws that cast serious doubt on its validity . First, it lacks 
empirical support. The only empirical finding Jack Levin and Jack 
McDevitt use to support their claim that bias crimes are excessively brutal 
is that, relative to other crimes, they are more likely to result in some 
physical injury to the victim. 19 This, however, does not suggest that bias 
crimes are inherently more brutal than other comparable crimes. All it 
proves is that, relative to other crimes, a disproportionately large number of 
bias crimes consist of assaults. It provides no basis for inferring that the 
brutality of bias-motivated assaults exceeds that of assaults not motivated 
by hatred. 
Second, the "excessive brutality" justification does not explain the 
need to enhance the sanction for bias crimes as opposed to the need to 
enhance the sanction for brutal crimes. Even if bias crimes are indeed more 
brutal, standard criminal law can take that into account by punishing brutal 
offenders more severely, irrespective of their motives. The availability of a 
wide range of punishments for each category of offenses gives judges the 
power to mete out greater punishments to brutal crime offenders. Brutality 
is a factor easily established evidentiarily, certainly more easily than 
motive . Thus, the alleged tendency of bias crimes to be excessively brutal 
does not provide an adequate justification for the enactment of bias crime 
laws. 
17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 39 ("[Bias] crimes are far more likely to be violent 
than are other crimes."). 
18. For a study supporting this view, see JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITT, HATE CRIMES: 
THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 11 (1993). This conviction is disputed in a recent 
book on hate crimes . See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 81-82 (citing LEVIN & MCDEVITT, 
supra, at 11 ); see also Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact Upon and Response of Victims and 
the Community, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES 176 
(Robert J. Kelly ed. , 1993) (discussing the impact of bias crimes). 
19. See LEVIN & McDEVITT, supra note 18, at 11. This finding is based on a study of the 
records of the Boston police from the years 1983 to 1987. 
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A some v.;hat related jw;tificati on that focuses on the impact of bias 
crimes on victims emphasizes the psycho log ical inj ury suffered by bias 
crime vic tims. This rationale originated in the celebrated case of Wisconsin 
v. Mitchel/ ,20 in which the Supreme Court stated that bias crimes are " more 
li ke ly to ... int1ict di stinct e moti onal harms o n the ir victims." 21 Although 
the Supreme Court cited no evide nce, this state ment won immediate favor 
with various scholars in the fi el d. who scurri ed to provide the mi ssing 
empirical data . Elaborati ng on the Supreme Court 's statement, Steven 
Bennett We isburd and Brian Lev in wrote th at "[b]ecause the violence 
[in volved in b ias crimes] is so bruta l, the degradatio n so complete and the 
vul nerability so omnipre sent, bias cri me VICtims exhibit greater 
psychological trauma th an non- bias victims." 22 Weisburd and Levin 
developed their theory ba~:ed on two studies of bias crime victims 
conducted by the National Insti tute Against Prejudice and Vio lence 
(NIAPV) in 1986 and 1989 . T hese studies reported the harsh psychological 
and emotional effects bias cri me had on victims, but fa iled to compare them 
to those experienced by victims of other crimes. This comparison was not 
made until 1994 when Arnold Barnes and Paul Ephross conducted a 
comparative study that surveyed the psychological and emotional injuries 
of all crime victims. They found that the psychological and emotio nal 
injuries suffered by bias crime vi ctims were virtually identical to those 
suffered by other victims, with one minor difference : Bias crime victims did 
not suffer f rom low self-esteem. 23 
Finally , some scholars maintain that the primary harm of bias crimes 
inheres in the discriminatory treatment of the victim. On this view, the 
victim of bias crime is harmed beyond the general right not to be physically 
injured because she is treated discriminatorily. That is, she is not merely 
subj ected to violence, but subjected to violence because of her race, sexual 
orientation, or other characteristic. 24 
Yet, as Anthony Dill of shows, this discriminatory treatment does not 
exacerbate the wrong committed by the perpetrator of the crime. Under 
Dill of's view, in order to es tablish a protectable interest, a person must 
show that a matter she is concerned with is properly her concern rather than 
20. 508 U.S. 476 (1 993) . 
21. !d. at 488. 
22. Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex ": Recognizing Gender-
Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 2 1, 25 (1 994) . 
23. See Arnold Barnes & Paul H. Ephross, The Impact of Hate Violence on Victims: 
EmoTional and Behavioral Responses to Attacks, 39 Soc. WORK 247, 250 (1994). Jacobs and 
Potter note, however, that certain " low-leve l" expressive offenses, such as the drawing of 
offe nsive graffiti and vandalism, may be carried out only against certain religious, ethnic , and 
otherwise marginalized groups. and thus in this context " greater harm arguments" may have 
some merit. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 84-85. 
24. For a good di scussion and rebuttal of this type of argument, see Dillof, supra note 3, at 
1036-49. 
516 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 109: 507 
someone else's. Recognizing the disCiiminatory treatment as an additional 
wrong di sassociated from the wrong of the vio lent crime it seif is an 
acknowledgment that the victim has a protectable interest in the 
perpetrator's thoughts. 25 While members of minorities are often justifiably 
concerned about other people's thoughts, their concerns do not amount to 
protectable interests and should not be regarded as such. 26 
2. The Impact of Bias Crime on Third Parties 
Another justification for bias crime legislation focuses on the external 
effects of these crimes on third parties, both within and outside the victim' s 
com munity. According to this justification, bias crimes have a unique 
impact on the broader community, an impact which warrants the harsher 
punishments meted out to bias crime offenders. Kent Greenawalt, for 
example, points out that bias crimes "can frighten and humiliate other 
members of the community" and "reinforce social divisions and hatred." 27 
Echoing this view, James Weinstein remarks that hate-driven violence "can 
inflict damage above and beyond the physical injury caused by a 
garden-variety assault, both to the immediate victim and to other members 
of the group to which the victim belongs." 28 
While bias crime invariably affects individuals removed from the 
immediate victim, it is not unique in this sense. As Jacobs and Potter 
observe, "Many crimes, whatever their motivation, have repercussions 
beyond the immediate victim and his or her family and friends ." 29 Jacobs 
and Potter list child abduction and murder as typical examples of crimes 
that strike fear in the hearts and minds of entire communities and often have 
a nationwide impact. 30 In fact, the list could be extended to include all 
violent crime. Public opinion polls reveal that Americans perceive crime as 
one of the nation's top problems.31 Others have proposed that the two most 
important factors that determine the impact of criminal activity may be 
visibility and proximity. 32 For example, the highly visible near-murder of a 
Central Park jogger in 1996 inspired terror in a very large number of New 
25. See id. at 1039-40. 
26. See id. at 1043-45. 
27. Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Justifications for Defining Crimes by the Category of 
Victim, 1992-1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 617,627. 
28. James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime Legislation: Where 's the 
Speech?, 11 CR!M. JUST. ETHICS 6, 10 (1992) . 
29. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 87. 
30. See id. 
31. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1994, at 140 tbl.2.1 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 
1995). 
32. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et a!., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER CERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et a!. eds. , 
1982). 
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Yorkers and drove many of them away from the p:1rk.33 Likewise, random 
street violence and gang-related crimes have a profoundly negative effect 
on inner-city dwellers, who are frequently exposed to these forms of 
criminal activity.'~ It is fair to conclude from the existing data that third 
parties tend to be affected more by the brutality and frequency of crimes 
than by the motives of the offender. 
A variant of the previous justification, also centering on the third-party 
effects of bias crimes, defends punishing bias crimes more severely on the 
ground that such crimes may trigger retaliation and spark further violence. 
In essence, this view maintains that criminal sanctions must take into 
account not only the actual harm caused by the offe nder but also the 
potential for future harms that are causally linked to her act. Whatever merit 
this utilitarian justification may have as a general theory of punishment, it 
suffers from three serious flaws as an explanation for bias crime legislation . 
First, bias crime legislation encompasses many offenses that do not give 
rise to the risk of retaliation. As Jacobs and Potter point out, "Retaliation 
arises mostly in the context of race and ethnic conflicts and rarely in the 
context of gay-bashing, anti-Semitic incidents, anti-Asian violence, and 
violence against women." 35 Yet all bias crimes are equally punishable 
under the law. Second, bias crimes are by no means the only offenses that 
carry potential for retaliation. Inter-gang violence and conflicts between 
organized crime groups also present a greater risk of retaliation. But such 
incidents of violence are dealt with by generic criminal law. Finally , and 
perhaps most importantly, the "possible retaliation" justification is at odds 
with longstanding principles of sentencing and fundamental notions of 
fairness . Imposing more severe punishments on offenders whose conduct 
sparked, or might have sparked, further violence would motivate offenders 
to direct their attacks at the weakest and most marginalized groups in the 
hope that such groups would be unable or unwilling to retaliate. 
Correspondingly, it would induce otherwise peace-seeking communities to 
resort to violence in order to deter bias crime offenders from preying on 
their members. Thus, the net effect of correlating punishment to actual or 
potential retaliation would be to render the communities most vulnerable to 
bias crime even more vulnerable, and to ttigger retaliatory violence on the 
part of bias crime victims. 
In the final tally , none of the existing justifications provides a solid 
basis for bias crime laws. The leading theories rely on dubious factual 
assumptions that have been discredited by various empirical studies. The 
failure of existing theorizing to justify bias crime laws has rendered the 
33. See JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 10, at 87. 
34. See id. 
35. !d. at 88. 
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laws a constant target for criticism and has spurred calls for their repcal. ·' 6 
Thi s failure retlects, in our view, the inherent limits of the wrongfulness-
culpability framework. 
A brief restatement of the reasons for the failure of the wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm to justify bias crime legi slation: The wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm supports differential sanctions for perpetrators of 
crime only so long as the behavior of one perpetrator is shown to be e ither 
more wrongful or more culpable than that of the others. Thus, under thi s 
paradigm, the enhancement of sanctions for bias crimes requires a showing 
that bias crimes are either more wrongful or more culpable than identical 
crimes not motivated by bias.37 For the reasons elaborated above , neither of 
these claims can be substantiated. The next Section examines and 
challenges the dominance of the wrongfulness-culpability framework as a 
unifying theory of criminal law and develops an alternative theory that 
explains many essential features of criminal law: the fair protection 
paradigm. 
C. Th e Limits of the Wrongfulness-Culpability Framework 
Traditionally, the primary concern of criminal law scholars has been to 
ensure fair treatment to criminal offenders . Under the prevailing view, 
fairness to criminal offenders demands proportionality between the 
seriousness of the crime and the severity of the penalty.38 The seriousness 
of the crime is determined by two factors: the wrongfulness of the act (that 
is, the moral quality of the act itself) and the culpability or accountability of 
the perpetrator. The wrongfulness element denotes the moral quality of the 
act, and the culpability element denotes the degree of moral responsibility 
of the perpetrator of the act. 39 Adherents to this view believe that 
wrongfulness and culpability are the only two legitimate factors that courts 
should consider in meting out punishment to criminal offenders or, as one 
champion of this view stated, "[t]o ask what punishment someone deserves 
is to ask how much wrong they did, and with what culpability they did that 
wrong." 40 Under this view, no factor should influence sentencing unless it 
can be shown to influence either the wrongfulness of the act or the 
culpability of the act ' s perpetrator. 41 
36. For a powerful attack on bias crime legi slation , see id. at 145-53. 
37. See Dillof, supra note 3, at I 019 (" [A]ll justifications for the increased penalties imposed 
by bias crime statutes can be analyzed as taking bias to be relevant to either gravity of wrongdoing 
or degree of culpability ." ). 
38. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 90 ( 1976). 
39. For an analys is of these concepts , see FLETCHER, supra note 7, § 6.6, at 454-91. 
40. Moore, supra note 7, at 237. 
41. Wrongfulness and culpability may be used in two different ways: in a foundati onal 
manner and in a de1ivative manne r. A utilitari an can also use terms such as wrongfulness o r 
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The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm consists of three distinct 
claims. First, it consists of a negative claim: that in determining the criminal 
sanction one should exclude all factors that do not bear upon the 
wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator.4c The 
considerations excluded by this principle are often grounded in impo11ant 
values, which the state has a legitimate interest in promoting; yet, under the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, it is illegitimate to take these 
considerations into account in determining criminal sanctions. Second, the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm consists of a positive claim: that the 
decisionmaker must take into account all the considerations that bear upon 
the wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator.-\3 Third, the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm employs a set of rules to assign weight 
to each of the relevant factors and calibrates the criminal sanction to retlect 
the cumulative weight of these considerations.4-l 
The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is not a complete theory of 
sentencing; instead, it can be best characterized as a framework for 
determining the appropriate sentence. Its ciassification as a framework is 
based on the fact that it provides no guidelines as to which factors 
determine the wrongfulness of an act or the culpability of the perpetrator. 
Hence, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm needs to be supplemented by 
independent theories of wrongfulness and culpability. 
The primary appeal of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm is the fact 
that it rests on the moral intuition that only aspects intrinsic to the crime 
itself should determine the magnitude and severity of criminal punishment. 
Taking other considerations into account violates the Kantian principle that 
the criminal perpetrator must not be used as a means to promote societal 
ends. This appeal is magnified by the fact that the wrongfulness-culpability 
culpability to mediate between utility and legal responsibility. A person who endorses this 
utilitarian view could even argue that wrongfulness and culpability are the only considerations 
that should determine the criminal sanction. But by making this claim, the utilitarian does not join 
the wrongfulness-culpability camp, because the meanings of the concepts "wrongfulness" and 
"culpability" are derivative. For the purpose of this Essay, the wrongfulness-culpability 
framework expresses a theory about the foundational values underlying sentencing. 
42. In the classification developed by Joseph Raz, the negative claim is an exclusionary 
reason~a reason that requires that the decisionmaker not act on the basis of considerations that do 
not bear on the wrongfulness of the act or the culpability of the perpetrator. For a discussion of 
exclusionary reasons, see JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-39 (1975). 
43. There are, however, disputes as to the positive claim. Everybody seems to agree that 
culpability is necessary to justify the imposition of a criminal sanction. Most scholars also argue 
that wrongfulness is also a necessary condition for inflicting a criminal sanction. See, e.g., 
FLETCHER, supra note 7, § 6.6.3, at 466-69; George P. Fletcher, What Is Punishment Imposed 
for?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 101 (1994). Others believe that wrongfulness is not a 
necessary condition, although it can influence how much punishment is deserved. See, e.g., 
Moore, supra note 7, at 238. The most extreme view is held by Douglas Husak, who believes that 
criminal liability does not require wrongdoing. See Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability 
Require an Act?, in PHfLOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 60 (Anthony Duff ed., 1998). 
44. For an articulation of such a theory, see FLETCHER, supra note 7, §§ 6.6 to 6.7, at 454-
504. 
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paradigm is capable of accommodating different theories of punishment 
with radically different understandings of the concepts of culpability and 
wrongfulness.45 Most importantly , its dual character seems to facilitate a 
dual concern for both the perpetrator of the crime (via its emphasis on 
culpability) and the victim (via its emphasis on wrongfulness). The 
culpability element focu ses primarily on the moral responsibility of the 
perpetrator of the crime and thus facilitates exoneration of the "innocent" 
(inculpable) perpetrators of wrongs.~6 The wrongfulness element concerns 
itse lf with the moral quality of the criminal conduct; in assessing the moral 
quality of different criminal acts, the wrongfulness element enables one to 
take into account the actual harm inflicted on the victim and society as a 
whole.47 Thus, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm seems to provide a 
comprehensive framework for sentencing, a framework flexible enough to 
accommodate the concerns of both victims and perpetrators of crime, and to 
ensure fairness to both. 
Naturally, the wrongfulness-culpability framework is not infinitely 
flexible. It cannot accommodate utilitarian theories of punishment, for 
instance. The utilitarian conviction that sentencing should maximize utility 
cannot plausibly be articulated in terms of wrongfulness or culpability .~ 8 
But given its ability to accommodate both the concerns of crime 
perpetrators and of victims, the wrongfulness-culpability framework seems 
45. Examining the diversity of theories that fall into this framework illustrates the flexibility 
of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. Subjectivist theories interpret wrongdoing by focusing 
on the actor's attitude toward the wrongdoing. The view that wrongfulness is grounded in the act 
itself rather than in its external results fits this paradigm. See id. § 6.6.5, at 475. Objectivist 
theories , in contrast, evaluate the wrongdoing in objective term s. The view that wrongfulness is 
grounded in results fits this position. See id. The debate, therefore, between objectivists and 
subjectivists is a debate within the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm-a debate about the nature 
of wrongfulness, not about the validity of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm itself. 
46. See id. § 6.6, at 455 (" [N]o one may be properly puni shed for a wrongful act (an act of 
wrongdoing) unless the act is attributable to him.") . 
47. The wrongfulness of an act has been interpreted differently by different theorists. Some 
regard wrongfulness in wholly objective terms, while others bel ieve that the wrongfulness of an 
act must be assessed by examining the beliefs of the perpetrator of the act. For a classification of 
the different theories of wrongfulness, see id. § 6.6.5, at 474-76. The great advantage of the 
objective theories of wrongfulness is their ability to accommodate the concern for the victims of 
crime. Arthur Ripstein has recently developed this argument. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 141 (1999) ("Punishment is scaled to the seriousness of the 
wrong rather than the expected advantage of the c1ime because it treats the denial of the victim's 
rights as the measure of the wrongdoer's gain."). 
48. Thus, Benn and Peters, in developing a utilitarian theory of punishment, argue: 
The retributivist's difficulty is that he wants the crime itself to indicate the amount of 
punishment, which it cannot do unless we first assume a scale of crimes and penalties. 
But on what principles is the scale to be constructed, and how are new offences to be 
fitted into it? These difficulties admit of no solution unless we agree to examine the 
consequences to be expected from penalties of different degrees of severity; i.e. unless 
we adopt a utilitarian approach. 
S.l. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 219 (1965). 
I 
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to constitute a comprehensive theory of punishment rhat can accommodate 
all fairness-based concerns. 
Yet a closer examination reveals that the wrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm cannot accommodate all faime:;s-based concerns. Undoubtedly, 
the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm can acc;__>rnmodate concerns of 
fairness toward the perpetrator of a crime. The culpability element ensures 
fairness to the perpetrator of a crime by eying her sanction to her 
responsibility. Furthermore, through the \Vrongfulness element, which 
considers the actual harm to the victim, the \Nrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm accommodates, to some extent, the concerns of crime victims. 
But the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm cannot accommodate 
victim-related fairness concerns that are not directly associated with the 
criminal act. Specifically, it cannot accommodate a concern for fair 
distribution of protection against crime among potential victims. The 
societal distribution of protection among potential victims is not, under the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, a relevant consideration in determining 
the sentence. The concern for fair distribution of protection is related 
neither to the wrongfulness of any particular act nor to the culpability of 
any particular offender. Under the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm, an 
offender is responsible for the wrong she committed if the wrong can 
justifiably be attributed to her. But no particular offender is responsible for 
the fact that the victim was particularly susceptible to crime due to the 
disposition of other criminals to prey on her. 
The case of high-risk victims poses a problem for the wrongfulness-
culpability paradigm since it resides beyond the purview of the 
wrongfulness-culpability inquiry. To appreciate the problem of high-risk 
victims, one has to look beyond the specific relations between the 
perpetrator of crime and the victim, and to examine instead the inter-
relations among victims as a group in light of their relative status in society. 
But since the inquiry under the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm does not 
cover such factors, it canriot address the problem of high-risk victims. 
One can challenge this claim by arguing that a high-ri sk victim is more 
vulnerable and, consequently, that a crime directed toward such an 
individual is more wrongful than a crime against a less vulnerable 
individual. Committing a crime against a person who is more likely to be a 
victim (and therefore in greater need of protection) is more wrongful than 
committing a crime against a person who is less likely to be a victim (and 
therefore less in need of protection). 
We believe that this argument fails because it does not take seriously 
the distinction between extra-sensitive victims and high-risk victims. A 
person who is a high-risk victim does not suffer a special harm if a crime is 
committed against her. Committing a crime against a high-risk individual 
does not impose a greater physical or mental harm on her, nor does it 
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dimini sh her overa ll well-bei ng more than it would for a person who is a 
low-risk vic tim. It seems arbitrary, there fore, to insi st that it is more 
wro ng: fu l to commi t a crime against a hi gh-risk victim than it is to commit a 
~ ~ ~ 
crime against a low-risk v i ctim.~'! 
The motivation to incorporate fair protection considerations into the 
concept of wrongfulness is not d iffi cult to detect. This motivation is based 
on the belief that fair protection considerations can be part of criminal law 
only if it is shown that they can be integrated into our understanding of the 
concept of wron gfuln ess . Under thi s view, if acts A and B are equally 
wrongful and are committed by equally culpable persons, there could be no 
reason to punish the perpetrator of A more than the perpetrator of B. Hence, 
without finding some way of incorporating fair protection concerns into the 
very concept of wrongfulness, such concerns cannot be integrated at all into 
the system of criminal law. 
It is not difficult to find examples that run counter to this v iew. 
Harming my child is not more wrongful than harming someone else's child. 
Yet I may have weightier reasons to protect my child than to protect 
someone else's child. It is possible, therefore , that an agent, such as a 
parent , may have a stronger obligation to prevent wrongful acts committed 
against X, her son, than wrongful acts committed against Y, someone else' s 
child. Another example that is more relevant to our context is the greater 
obligation of the state to prevent wrongs committed against its citi zens than 
to prevent identical wrongs committed against noncitizens. 
An advocate of the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm may concede 
this point but argue that despite this conceptual possibility , it is indeed more 
wrongful to commit a crime against a high-risk victim. But such an 
expansive understanding of the concept of wrongfulness undermines the 
theory. In particular, it is imperative for such a theory to demonstrate the 
greater wrongfulness of a crime directed at a high-risk victim without 
relying in any way on the premise that the state has a greater obligation 
toward these victims. 
We do not deny the possibility that, in principle, one could develop a 
theory of wrongfulness that would incorporate fair protection concerns. Yet 
incorporating fair protection into the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm 
would radically transform the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. It would 
require an expansion of the concept of wrongfulness far beyond its 
traditional boundaries. If our arguments motivate the advocates of the 
49. Naturally , being a high-1isk victim may be corre lated with greater fear on the part of the 
victim and excessive precautions that dismpt her life. An actual crime committed ag ainst a high-
ri sk victim may cause her greater harm due to her acute awareness of her special vulnerability. 
Committing a Clime against a high-risk victim of this type is indeed particul arl y wrongful. This 
conclusion, however, is due not to the fact that the victim is at high ri sk. but to other fac tors that 
may be caus ally rel ated to her vulnerability, such as her fear and the disruption of her life. 
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wrongfu lness-culpability paradigm to integrate fair protection 
considerat ions into the concept of wrongfulness , thi s result merely 
demonstrates the compelling normative force of fair protection, cunently 
neg lec ted by criminal law theori sts. 
In sum, fair protection considerations cannot be readily incorporated 
into the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. fmport ing them into the 
concept of wrongfulness would stretch the noti on of wrongfulness well 
beyond its conventional meaning. 
But should the greater vulnerability of victims affec t sentencing 
practices? Do high-ri sk victims really have a right to greater protection? 
And if they do, can thi s right justify the imposition of differenti a l sanctions 
accord ing to the vulnerability of the victims? The next Part illustrates that 
such a right actually exists and that, consequently , one of the primary 
defi c iencies of the wrongfulness-culpability parad igm is its failure to 
address the special concerns of vulnerable victims. 
[]. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE FAIR PROTECTION P ARADIGM 
The fair protection paradigm is premised on the insight that one of the 
primary aims of CJiminal law should be to di stribute protection in an 
egalitarian manner. Consequently, it maintains that criminal sanctions 
should be crafted in accordance with this goal. 
The principle of equality enjoys pride of place in moral and political 
philosophy. Yet there is a wide di sagreement among philosophers about the 
role of equality as an independent value and the ramifications it has for 
shaping political and social institutions. Some contemporary moral 
philosophers believe that equality is a fundamental principle of a just 
society and that disagreements about the nature of justice are essentially 
di sagreements about the concept of equality. Dworkin regards equality as a 
foundational value,50 and hi s position has been very influential among 
political theorists. Likewise, Rawls's theory of justice regards equality as a 
fundamental value. 51 
Other philosophers, however, reject this view. Most notably, Raz 
believes that equality is not an independent value at all and that while 
enhancing equality can promote justice in various legal contexts, it can do 
so not because inequality is evil but because the pursuit of equality helps 
satisfy the greater needs of people who are worse off_52 Thus, even those 
50. See RON ALD DWORKIN, What Rights Do We Ha ve ?, in T AKJ NG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266 
( 1977); Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, I Soc. PHIL. & POL. 24 (1983) . 
5 1. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 504-12 ( 1972). 
52. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 2 17-44 (1986); see also Harry Frankfurt, 
Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 2 1 ( 1987), reprinted in HARRY FRANKFURT, THE 
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 134, 149 (1988) ("The fu ndamental error of 
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who ascribe no independent value to equality do not advocate a political 
system indifferent to disparities in wealth or other goods. Instead, they 
maintain that the reduction of wealth or other disparities is merely a 
byproduct of the state's fulfilling its obligations to its citizens. 
A simple example may help elucidate this view. If A is on the verge of 
starvation while B is only mildly hungry, the greater and more urgent need 
of A, rather than a desire to promote equality between A and B, provides a 
reason to help A before helping B. The greater need of A generates a strong 
reason to give the bread to A. The lesser need of B generates a weak reason 
to provide B with the bread. Consequently, the reason to provide A with the 
bread oven-ides the reason to provide B with the bread, and a person who 
acts in accordance with reason is required to provide A with the bread. 
Satisfying more urgent individual needs would often resulr in a more 
egalitarian distribution of resources , but it is the needs of each individual 
that determine what she deserves-not the duty to minimize disparity 
among different individuals. 
This Essay is neutral with respect to this central philosophical debate 
concerning equality. While our analysis is phrased in terms of equality of 
protection, it does not presuppose that equality of protection is a 
foundational value. The fair protection paradigm can be grounded in the 
value of providing equality of protection against crime to victims. But it 
could also be interpreted as granting priority to the greater need for 
protection of vulnerable victims. This enables us to remain neutral as to 
whether the primary justification for such a policy is grounded m the 
aspiration to eliminate the inherent evils of inequality or, rather, in the 
desire to satisfy the greater needs of particularly vulnerable victims. 
Our defense of the fair protection paradigm proceeds as follows : 
Section A develops a fairness-based account of criminal law, which we call 
"the fair protection paradigm." That Section espouses the view that 
fairness in distribution of protection against crime entitles pa~ticularly 
vuinerable individuals to a greater degree of protection. It also demonstrates 
that the fair protection paradigm actually forms a theoretical basis for many 
of the accepted practices of the criminal justice system. Section B 
demonstrates that the fair protection paradigm is grounded in current 
sentencing practices. 
A. The Fair Protection Paradigm 
The fair protection paradigm requires the state to distribute protection 
in a fair manner to potential crime victims. The fair protection paradigm is 
egalitarianism li es in supposing that it is morally important whether one person bas less than 
another regardless of how much one of them has."). 
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premised on the understanding that criminal law is a means of providing 3 
good-protection against crime-and, therefore, that it is crucial to 
guarantee that the good produced by criminal law be distributed fairly. This 
Section demonstrates that fair protection is a compelling normative 
principle that has important ramifications for understanding many of the 
prevailing practices of criminal law. Yet the meaning of fairness is far from 
settled. Theories of distributive justice differ radically in defining what: 
constitutes a fair distribution of goods and, in particular, what a fair 
distribution of protection from crime would entail. 
Under one possible interpretation, fairness requires that the state not 
discriminate between criminal offenders on the basis of the victims' 
identities.53 Equality, on this view, means treating all perpetrators of crimes 
identically regardless of their victims' special needs and vulnerability to 
crime. Thus, if the criminal law equally punishes crimes against African 
Americans and crimes against whites, it respects the demands of equality in 
two ways. First, it treats criminals equally by insisting that people who are 
equally culpable and who have committed equally wrongful acts be equally 
punished. Second, it protects victims equally because imposing differential 
sanctions on criminals who have committed similar acts violates the rights 
of different victims to be treated equally. Let us explore each of these 
arguments. 
Under the first argument, the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm 
guarantees equality to the perpetrators of crime. Equality is guaranteed 
under this view because meting out different punishments to equally 
culpable perpetrators of equally wrongful criminal acts arguably 
discriminates on irrelevant grounds and, consequently, violates the 
requirement that the state treat criminal offenders fairly. 
Yet this analysis is subject to serious objections. First, it fails to explain 
prevailing sentencing practices. The possibility of rehabilitation is often 
considered an important factor in sentencing. Yet, if one takes seriously the 
argument that equally culpable perpetrators of equally wrongful crimes 
should be subjected to identical sanctions, it is illegitimate to consider the 
possibility of rehabilitation. Second, the argument presupposes what it 
purports to prove. It is implicitly based on the premise that differential 
sanctions are discriminatory unless they are grounded in differences in the 
culpability of the perpetrator or the wrongfulness of the act. Yet it is 
precisely this premise that the fair protection paradigm challenges. Under 
the fair protection paradigm, differential sanctions do not discriminate 
between equally situated criminals. Instead, they ref1ect the differential 
53. This follows from the "parity requirement," namely, the requirement that individuals 
who commit similar crimes should not be subjected to different punishments. See VON HIRSCH, 
supra note 38, at 72-73. 
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obligations on the part of the state to protect victims who differ in their 
vulnerability to crime. Just as the greater obligation of the parent to protect 
her child should not be perceived as discriminatory , so too the greater 
obligation of the state to protect its more vulnerable members should not be 
described as such. The wrongfulness-culpability paradigm cannot account 
for these concerns because the concept of equality upon which it is 
predicated is ill-equipped to capture the complexity of human interaction. 
Under the second argument, the wrongfulness-culpability framework 
protects victims equally. It distributes protection in a just manner because 
meting out different punishments to offenders because of the identity of 
their victims runs afoul of the idea of equality of victims. Punishing 
identical criminal acts against different victims differently would convey 
the message that certain citizens are more worthy than others, or at least 
that crimes committed against certain victims are less condemnable and 
therefore more "legitimate" than others. Thus, both the requirement to treat 
victims equally and the requirement to treat perpetrators of crime equally 
requires punishment in accordance with the wrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm. 
In order to rebut these arguments, imagine a society in which both 
smoking and drinking are prohibited. The society is divided into a group of 
smokers who inflict harm on the drinkers and a group of drinkers who 
inflict harm on smokers. Assume further that there is much more illegal 
drinking in public than illegal smoking and that, consequently, smokers are 
much more exposed to illegal drinking than drinkers to illegal smoking. The 
disparity in the amount of protection actually afforded to smokers suggests 
that the system is unfair to the smokers, and one could persuasively argue 
that the disparity in the protection granted to smokers and drinkers is a 
cause for concern. Under a plausible interpretation of the fair protection 
paradigm, the disparity between drinkers and smokers may provide a 
sufficient reason for imposing harsher sanctions on illegal drinking than on 
illegal smoking. 
In order to implement the fair protection paradigm, one needs a way of 
comparing the degree of protection granted to different potential victims. 
For the purpose of this Essay, we use a simple measure based on the 
concept of vulnerability . The vulnerability of a person to crime depends on 
the expected costs of crime for this person. The greater an individual's 
expected costs of crime, the more vulnerable she is.54 The expected costs of 
crime can be calculated by multiplying the probability of a crime by the 
size of the harm caused by the crime. 
54. For an attempt to explore the view that the expected costs of crime should be equalized 
among different victims, see Hare!, supra note 8, at 1204-07. 
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T his characteri zati o n of the concept of vulnerabili ty is no t as sc ientifi c 
as it In ay ~~CeH1 . The E1agnj tu de of ths harrn i~~: often a vague ccncept . rrhe 
harm may involve a violation o f th e dignitary interests of the victim or the 
violation of her autonomy , and any evaluation of the magnitude of those 
harms is inevitably controversial. Moreover, the concept of probability of 
harm is also less well-defined th an it may seem. Shou ld probability be 
measured with respect to aggregate exposure to all types of crime, or should 
it be measured separately for every individual otlense? What is the relevant 
time frame for measuring it? Rather than provide a full-fledged measure for 
vu lnerabi lity, our discussion presents a framework for such an enterpri se . 
Such a framework is sufficient because this Essay is concerned merely with 
estab li shing the fundamental contours of the fair protection paradigm rather 
than with its precise implementation. 
Once one establishes the basic means of measuring the degree of 
vulnerability to crime, it is necessary to desi gn a principle of distributive 
justice to guide the fair di stributi on of protection among pote ntial victims of 
crime. To this end , we will compare two contrasting views of the principle 
governi ng the distribution of protection. 
Under one radically egalitarian view, fair distribution of protection 
against crime would require the state to equalize the expected costs of crime 
for all potential victims. This view would imply a duty on the part of the 
state to address any vulnerability to crime, regardless of its source, and to 
place all its citizens on an equal footing in terms of their exposure to crime. 
For the reasons articulated earlier, however, such a radically egalitarian 
view cannot be sustained. 
We argued that vulnerability to crime is a function of myriad factors 
such as wealth, age, attitude toward risk, life experience, and physical and 
intellectual prowess. Some of these factors, such as the willingness of the 
victim to take precautions against crime, do not justify intervention by the 
state . The state cannot reasonably be expected to annul all the disparities in 
the vulnerability of different potential crime victims. 
T he implausibility of the radical egalitarian view does not , however, 
necessitate a radically inegalitarian view, namely, the view that the state 
should be blind to differences in vulnerability to crime among victims. In 
fact, the state's failure to redress some of the disparities in the expected 
costs of crime among different potential victims is inherently unjust. Hence, 
the only viable position is the intermediate view presented in this Essay-
that the state should annul certain disparities in the vulnerability of different 
victims while allowing other disparities to remain. 
One of the primary tasks of a theory of criminal law, under the fair 
protection paradigm, is to explain which factors influencing vulnerability to 
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gr::~J. ter vul nefJOHtty coutL .Je attribute to ... ~ e v~r~-t taCHY;.-s , sorne o! \VDJcn 
ju :; [ify interference on the part of the state whil e others do not. Complying 
under these circumstances with the demands of equality may often prove 
very challenging. To see why, it is useful to return to our fanciful society of 
drinkers and smokers . 
Assume no\v that both drinking and smoking are prohibited and that 
both prohibitions are enforced. However, the drinkers are less law-abiding 
than the smokers. Thus, there is a lot more ill egal drinking than ill egal 
smoking. l'vloreover, smokers share an inclination to subject themselves 
voluntarily to the risks of illegal drink:ing because they like to tease and 
harass drinkers. Thus, they tend to congregate around drinkers, and, 
consequently, they suffer from greater harms inflicted upon them by illegal 
drinking. In thi s case, the disparate harm to smokers is attributable to two 
factors: the beh<wior of the illegal drinkers and the smokers' inclination to 
be around them. 
It seems reaso nable that the disparity in vulnerability attributable to the 
greater inclination of drinkers to violate the law should be annulled, while 
the disparity attributable to the greater inclination of smokers to subject 
themselves to the risks of illegal drinking should not be annulled by the 
state. If this normative premise is adopted by the society, then the principle 
of fair protection requites the legal system to make a special effort to 
remedy the portion of the harm that stems from the illegal behavior of the 
drinkers, but leave the portion of the harm that stems from the idiosyncratic 
55. Under one possible view, the state has an obligation to annul those disparities not 
attributable to the victim ' s own choices. Yet the conclusion that the state has no obligation to 
annul any disparities attributable to a person's choices is false. If the greater vulnerability to crime 
is attJibutable to socially valuable activities, one may justifiably insist that those who perform 
these activities be guaranteed a high degree of protection despite their voluntary decision to 
expose the mselves to crime. Thus , we insist on granting full protection to individuals who use 
their First Amendment rights in a way that provokes a hostile reaction, even if by doing so they 
voluntarily expose themselves to severe risks. The so-called "Heckler's Veto" doctrine requires 
that police use available resources to protect a speaker who inflames a hostile audience because of 
the special importance of freedom of expression, despite the voluntary nature of the speech that 
generates the risks. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTfTUTJONAL LAW§ 12-10, at 853-55 (2d ed. 1988). Another example can 
be used w illustrate this point. Some owners of factories or stores decide, for ideological or 
com merc ial reasons, to place their businesses in a depressed, high-crime area. Such commercial 
activity is socially valuable because it provides economic opportunity to the disadvan taged. 
Hence, it seems justified to devote more public resources to the protection of those businesses, 
despite the voluntary exposure of those businesses to the ri sks of crime. Thus , the fact that 
disparity in the vulnerability of different victims is attributable to their own choices does not entail 
that the state has no obligation to annul it. For a full discuss ion, see Hare!, supra note 8, at 
1204-05. 
Similarly, the fac t that disparity in the vulnerability of different victims cannot be attributed 
to their own choices does not entail that the state has an obligation to annul it. Na'ivete may 
increase one's vulnerability to cri me, yet it does not necessarily justify greater efforts on the part 
of the state to annul the disparity in the vulnerability of na'ive and sophisticated victims. 
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preferences of the smokers unaddressed. To accomplish thi s, the soc iery 
rnust either assign the harm to the smokers in proportion to its cau ses or 
diminish the frequency of illegal drinking to the point at which it \Vould 
have been if drinkers had been as law-abiding as smokers. One way to 
accompli sh the latter is to increase the sanction on illegal drinking, in order 
to reduce the frequency of thi s behavior to the level at which it would have 
been had drinkers been law-abiding citizens. It bears emphasizing that the 
imposition of harsher sanctions in such cases is not intended to reflect the 
greater wrongfulness of the act or the greater culpability of the actor, but 
rather to equalize the distribution of protection by deterring offenders from 
. . . . . . . ~ 
committing cnmes agamst certam VlCtims. 
The primary challenge for the fair protection paradigm is to determine 
which differences in the vulnerability of different victims are relevant to the 
distribution of protection against crime and which are not. A 
comprehensive treatment of this challenge is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. Yet, once the principle of fair protection is accepted, and once it is 
used to enhance the sanctions inflicted upon criminals who commit crimes 
against vulnerable victims , it is intuitively plausible to argue that 
vulnerability attributable to race, gender, or sexual orientation justifies 
interference on the part of the state. A more complete defense of this view 
will be articulated in Part III. The next Section demonstrates that the fair 
protection paradigm has a powerful explanatory force. It illustrates that 
some contemporary practices of criminal law can be explained only as 
aimed at fair protection of potential victims of crime. 
B. The Fair Protection Paradigm and Contemporary Sentencing Practices 
Some sentencing practices embedded in the Sentencing Guidelines 
should be interpreted as reflecting a concern for fair protection of potential 
victims of crime. Section 3A 1.1 (b) of the Sentencing Guidelines states: "If 
the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was 
unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a 
victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct, 
increase by 2 levels." 57 The provision's commentary offers some examples 
to illustrate when the provision should be used . It states, for example, that 
enhancement of the sanction would apply in a "fraud case where the 
56. It should not be inferred from our discussion that we are committed to the view that the 
disparity between drinkers and smokers should be redressed by the state. This example illustrates, 
however, the potentially general applicability of the fair protection paradigm to issues less 
controversial than bias crime. 
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MA NUAL§ 3Al.l(b) (1998). 
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defendant marketed an ineffecti ve cure to cancer patie nts or m a robbery 
where the defendant targeted a handicapped victim.·· 58 
The traditional interpretation of thi s provi sion maintai ns that it was 
enacted to enhance the sanction of the more criminally depraved.59 Under 
thi s interpretation, this provision fits into the wrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm, as it infli cts harsher sanction s on those who are more culpable. 
Yet courts often use this provision to enhance the sanctions of offenders 
who attack vulnerable victims on the theory th at such victims are less able 
to defend them selves .60 This practice seems to comport better with the fair 
protection paradigm. 
Interestingly, courts often claim that the fact that a criminal chose a 
victim who cannot defend herself indicates a greater depravity on his 
behalf. 6 1 Yet the premise that the willingness of the criminal perpetrator to 
exploit such a weakness makes him parti cularly culpable is not self-evident. 
A willingness to cause a greater wrong to a victim indicates greater 
depravity . But the harm intlicted by a cri me against a vulnerable victim is 
not necessarily greater than the harm inflicted by a crime against a less 
vulnerable victim. In fac t, in some cases the harm inflicted on vulnerable 
(hi gh-risk) victims is less serious than the harm inflicted on less vulnerable 
(low-risk) victims. The inability to defend oneself increases one's 
probability of becoming a crime victim. Yet such a person need not be a 
particularly sensitive victim. Sometimes, the very factor that makes a 
person a high-ri sk victim may also make her a low-sensitivity victim.62 
One might, nevertheless, argue that crime directed at high-risk victims 
is morally worse than crime directed at low-risk victims. Under this view, 
which relies on the concept of fair play, it is simply particularly heinous to 
prey on a high-risk victim because the victim does not have a fair 
58. !d. § 3A 1.1 commentary , discussed in Jay Dyckman, Note , Brightening the Line: 
Properly Identifying a Vulnerable Victim for Pt~~poses of Section JAJ .l of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines , 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1960, 1969-70 ( 1998). 
59. See Dyckman, supra note 58, at 1974-75 (citing case law in seven circuits). 
60. See, e.g. , United States v. Shumway, 11 2 F.3d 14 13, 1423 (lOth Cir. 1997) (" [T]he 
' vulnerable victim ' is someone who is unable to protect hi mself or herself from criminal conduct, 
and is therefore in need of greater societal protection than the average citizen."). 
6 1. See supra notes 59-60. 
62 . Consider the following example. A group of youngs ters attacks a mentally disabled 
individual. The aggression is meant primarily to humiliate the person rather than to cause pai n. 
The mentally challenged indi vidual is a hi gh- tisk victim because of his deficiency. Yet, because 
of his limited mental ability, the person is not capable of comprehending the humiliation he goes 
through, and consequently does not suffer the same emotional trauma that another person would 
suffer under these circumstances. 
Courts often apply the vulnerable victim enhancement of section 3Al.l to victims who are 
hi gh-risk but not highly sensitive. Such a reading is advanced by several circuits. The Fifth Circuit 
found that women desperate for romance were unusually vulnerable to a fraudulent scam that 
targeted victims through personal advertisements. See United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 53 1, 
541-42 (5th Cir. 1995). Similarly , the Third Circuit upheld an enhancement of a stockbroker who 
used his relationship with his girlfriend to pressure her parents into investing in his fraudulent 
scheme. See United States v. Astorri , 923 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 199 1). 
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opportuni ty to defe nd herse lf. This view is su pported by the fact that many 
courts have stat:::d that section 3/\ 1.1 of the Sente ncing Guidelines is 
parti cularly relevant to cases in which the victim cannot defend herself. "3 
But this view is prem ised on an analogy between criminality and 
sportsmanship-a dubious analogy, at best. 64 The ability or inability of the 
victim to defend herself is perce ived as rele vant to sente ncing only because 
of the victim 's greater need fo r protection. It is not surpri sing , therefore, 
that courts often slip from rhetoric that fits the wrongfulness-culpability 
paradigm to rhetoric that better f its the fair protec ti on paradigm.65 From the 
vantage point of the fair protection paradigm , the pri mary justification for 
enhancing the punishment of criminals who assault vulnerable victim s is 
the greater need for pro tection of these victims and the greater 
responsibility of society to inves t in protecting vi ctims who face greater 
ri sks . 
The enactment of sect ion 3A 1.1 raised numerous di sputes among courts 
concerning the nature of the vulnerability that justifies enhancement of 
criminal sanctions. Some courts ha ve interpreted the provision broadly, 
while others have interpreted it nmTowly. Advocates of the narrow view 
have stressed the need to limit the provision to cases in which the victim is 
uniquely vulnerable. 66 Proponents of the broad view, on the other hand , 
have argued that any vulnerability justifies use of secti on 3Al.l. 
The fair protection paradigm interprets the concept of vulnerability in 
section 3A l.l in a way familiar to philosophers who write about 
distributive justice. Some philosophers believe that disparities among 
63. See, e.g., Uni ted States v. 0 ' Neil, 11 8 F. 3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub JZOm. 
Saia v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 728 ( 1998) C In determin ing vul nerabili ty, we focu s not on the 
li kelihood or extent of harm to the individual if the crime is successful, but on the extent of the 
individual' s ability to protect himse lf from the crime."); United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 486 
(1 st Cir. 1996) (" [T]he vulnerable vi ctim guideline is primarily concerned with the impaired 
capacity of the victim to detect or preve nt the crime."); United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 504 
(4 th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant 's robbery attempts aimed at the elderly, "who, by 
virtue of their age, were less ph ys icall y ab le to defend themse lves ," satisfied section 3A 1.1 's 
criteria); United States v. Lalle mand, 989 F. 2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[a] 
vulnerable or susceptible victim is (! ) less likely to defend himself, (2) less likely perhaps to be 
aware that he is a victim of crime, (3) less li ke ly to complain" ); United States v. White, 903 F.2d 
457,463 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding an enhancement for a defendant who kidnapped a 60-year-old 
gas stati on attendant who had respiratory prob lems, and agreeing with the government's position 
that " [the defendant] would have had a far more difficult time and may have in fact been un able 
to successfully kidnap a younger or healthier individual who might have been able to run and 
successfully flee from the knife-wielding [defendant]"); see also RICHARD G. SINGER, JusT 
DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUAUTY AND DESERT 86 (1 979) (" [C]riminals who 
knowingly select victims who are incapable of defending themselves are more morally 
blameworthy than others."). 
64. This view is misguided, for it foc uses exclusivel y on the perpetrator of the crime while 
neg lecting the victim 's perspecti ve. A victim-oriented perspecti ve would reject, therefore, the 
attempt to explain the Sentencing Guidelines in terms of the wrongfulness or the culpability of the 
perpetrator of the crime. 
65. See supra notes 59-60. 
66. For a th orough discuss ion, see Dyckman, supra note 58. 
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individuals can be justified when they can be attributed to their choices .67 
Others believe that di sparities among individuals can be justified if they can 
be attributed to their preferences, irrespective of whether they could have 
chosen otherwise.68 One's view as to whether the state should annul the 
di sparity in the vulnerability of different victims depends, therefore, on 
one's convictions as to which kinds of disparities the state has an obligation 
to annul. 
Can the punishment of bias crimes be interpreted as a mechanism to 
provide equal protection to potential victims? Do these statutes reduce 
disparity in the protection of different victims? 
III. BIAS CRIMES AND FAIR PROTECTION 
This Part examines whether the fair protection paradigm can justify 
bias crime legislation . Section A provides arguments favoring such a 
rationale. Section B addresses potential objections to this explanation. 
A. Can the Fair Protection Paradigm Justify Bias Crime Legislation? 
Bias crimes are crimes committed because of the race, color, religion, 
or sexual orientation of the victim. Bias crime legislation enhances the 
sanctions imposed on such crimes, relative to the sanctions imposed on 
similar crimes not motivated by bias. By imposing harsher sanctions on bias 
crimes, such legislation does not simply reduce the frequency of bias 
crimes; it also reduces the exposure of the members of different groups to 
bias crime in a differential manner. The neutral language employed in bias 
crime statutes should not lead one to the erroneous conclusion that such 
statutes have an identical effect on all groups. One should not confuse 
neutral language with neutral impact. The greater the group's exposure to 
bias crimes, the greater its benefit from bias crime legislation. 
In fact, the neutral language of bias crime statutes is virtuous in an 
important sense: It allows social reality to determine the practical effects of 
bias crime legislation. More specifically, it ensures that the group most in 
need of greater protection at any given time will actually receive it. For 
example, if African Americans are attacked more frequently on racial 
grounds , effective bias crime legislation will benefit African Americans 
more than it does whites. If, in the future, a different group becomes more 
67. See, e.g. , Richard J. Arneson , Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 PHIL. 
STUD. 77 (1989); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 922 
(1989). 
68. See, e.g. , Ronald Dworkin , What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, I 0 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 283,291-304 (1981). 
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vulnerable to crime, the ex isting scheme will automaticall y provide it with 
more protection. 
Moreover, the fair protection paradigm explains some of the more 
salient features of bias crime legislation that cannot be explained by the 
wrongfulness-culpability paradigm. Some bias crime statutes define bias 
crimes as those committed because of the race, gender, re ligion, or sexual 
orientat ion of the victim .69 However, not all bias crime statutes require 
" racial" or " other" animus toward the victims. As Frederick Lawrence 
points out, bias crime statutes can be di vided into two models: a " racial 
an imus model" and a " discriminatory selection model." 70 The raci al 
animus model requires hostility toward the victim group as a constitutive 
element of bias crime. The discriminatory selection model does not pose 
any such requirement. All that is required under the discriminatory model is 
that the race of the victim should somehow figure into the offender's 
decision to act against her. 
The discriminatory model of bias crime has proven to be especially 
problematic for champions of the wrongfulness-culpability framework . The 
fo llowing case suggested by Dillof illustrates the difficulty: "Mike is a 
mugger who mugs blacks simply because he believes that the police are less 
likely to vigorously investigate muggings of blacks. Mike feels no animus 
toward blacks, but Mike' s belief concerning blacks has played a role in the 
reasoning that led to his intention to assault blacks." 71 
Dillof correctly points out that the wrongfulness-culpability paradigm 
provides no reason to punish Mike more harshly in the case of hi s 
apprehension. Admittedly, Mike selected his victims because of their race, 
but he did so only to lower the probability of his anest. Mike's motive was 
purely prudential; he did not act out of hostility or animosity toward his 
victims, and thus no special culpability should attach to Mike. 
Dill of's argument presents no difficulty whatsoever to the fair 
protection paradigm. Taking the perspective of the victim, the fair 
protection paradigm provides ample reason why offenders like Mike should 
be subjected to a greater sanction. Mike, in the above hypothetical example, 
69. See Dill of, supra note 3, at I 023. 
70. LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 29-39. Yet Lawrence himself admits that 
[t]he landscape of state bias crime law thus consists of a few statutes falling clearly 
within the discriminatory selection model or the racial animus model and a substantial 
number of bias crime laws that are ambiguous as to what they punish. Several states 
including Wisconsin have adopted an explicit discriminatory se lection statute 
governi ng bias crimes against a person, although virtually all state institutional 
vandalism laws are of thi s model. Several states have expli citly adopted the racial 
animus model. But the majority of states with bias crime Jaws are not clear as to which 
models they employ. 
!d. at 38. For our purposes, it is important to note that the constitutionality of the discriminatory 
selection model was affirmed by Wisconsin v. Mitchell , 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
71. Dillof, supra note 3, at I 076. 
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sought to take advantage of the enhanced vu lnerability to crime of the black 
population , which resu lted from the reluctance of the police to invest igate 
crimes against them. This enhanced vulnerability of blacks made them 
desirable targets to offenders like Mike as well as to other offenders who. 
unlike M ike, may be motivated by raci al animus. Thus , enhancing the 
sanct ion for offend ers who act again st blacks was necessar; in thi s case to 
equalize the vulnerability of blacks to crime. The greater deterrence 
provided by the increased sanction compensates in this case, and in man y 
others. for the initially hi gher vulnerab ility of blacks . 
An even more troubling case for the adherents of the wrongfulness-
culpabi I ity paradigm is that of the " Violent Show-Off. " 7 ~ Frederick 
Lawrence describes the " Violent Show-Off' phenomenon as follows: 
The Violent Show-Off's purpose is to assault a victim in a manner 
that will impress his friend s. To him, it is of no importance that the 
manner itself calls for the discri minatory selection of a victim . 
Although the racially di scriminatory dimension of the Viol ent 
Show-Off's ac t is unconnected to the purpose of hi s conduct, he 
does act with knowledge of his friends' prejudice.73 
Peer pressure and the desire to please others may indeed prompt attacks on 
members of certain racial , religious, or gay groups , but champions of the 
wrongfulness-culpability theory staunchly insist that such attacks should 
not be considered bias crimes, since the offender lacked racial animus 
toward the victim. As Fredrick Lawrence concludes, "[T]he Violent Show-
Off still must meet the elements of a racial animus model statute. If he is 
separated from the rac ial animus of his friends-if he had neither 
knowledge of their animus nor reasonable basis to suspect it, then he ... is 
not guilty of a bias crime." 74 
Yet the fair protection paradigm recognizes that "Violent Show-Offs" 
pose an additional risk to minorities' safety: the risk of being attacked by 
people who do not necessarily hate minorities but who assault them 
nevertheless to impress their friends. Thus, the possibility of being attacked 
by a Violent Show-Off increases certain victims' need for protection. The 
fair protection paradigm would grant such victims greater protection m 
order to equalize their vulnerability to that of other potential victims. 
72. The " Violent Show-Off' example ori ginated in a hypothetical proposed by the Attorney 
General of Wisconsin during the oral argument to the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-l 0, Wisconsin v. Mitchell , 508 U.S. 476 (No. 92-515), 
discussed in LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 74. 
73. LAWRENCE, supra note 3, at 75. 
74. !d. at 78 . 
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B. Objections ro the Fair Protecrion Paradigm 
The fair protection paradigm gives rise to several obj ections. The most 
powerful objection is that , although bias crime leg islati on promotes the 
objecti ve of red ucing the disparity in the vulnerability of different victims, 
that is not the primary inten tion of the legislation . ln order to present thi s 
objection, let us examine carefully the differences between section 3A 1.1 of 
the Sentencing Gui del ines, which enhances the sanctions for those who 
commit crimes again st vulnerable victims, and bias crime legisl at ion. 
There are two primary differences between bias crime legislation ancl 
legislation protecting vu lnerable victims. First , bias crime legislation 
requires that the vict im be selected because of her gender, race , religion, or 
sexual orientation,75 while section 3A 1.1 of the Sentencing Gui del ines 
applies to any case in which the victim belongs to the vulnerable group. 76 
Second , bias crime legislation applies to crimes committed because of race, 
gender, sexual orientation, or religion , irrespective of whether the vict im 
belongs to a more vulnerable group . Bias crime legislation enhances the 
punishment of those who commit crimes against members of more 
vulnerable groups as well as those who commit crimes against members of 
less vulnerable groups. A racially motivated attack by an African American 
on a white person is no less a bias crime than a similarly moti vated at tack 
by a white against an African American . 
For these two reasons , it may be argued that bias crime legislation 
cannot effectively reduce inequality of protection. If the primary aim of bias 
crime legislation had been to promote equality of protection against crime, 
it would enhance only the sanctions of perpetrators of crime who attacked 
vulnerable groups, irrespective of the motives underlying the attack. 
Likewise, if the aim of bias crime legislation had been to reduce disparity in 
the vulnerability of different victims, it would enhance punishment only for 
those who directed their violence at members of a particularly vulnerable 
group. Such legislation would be analogous to legislation that protects other 
vulnerable groups, such as section 3A 1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 77 
However, an important difference between the goal of section 3A 1.1 
and the goal of bias crime legislation may justify the different drafti ng 
techniques. The vulnerability with which the Sentencing Guidelines deals 
does not depend on cultural prejudices and beliefs. In contrast, bias crime is 
rooted in cultural prejudices that change over time and space. Although race 
75. On the complexity o f the concept of causality, see JACOBS & POTIER, supra note I 0, 
ch. 2. 
76. In fact, some might suggest that crimes motivated by hatred toward the majority should 
be excluded from the definition of hate crimes. Yet such a view could possibly violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment ' s Equal Protection Clause . See id. at 17. 
77. See supra Section II.B. 
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is a primary and persistent source of tension in our soc iety, the primary 
victims of racial hostility may not always be identifi ed in advance. A statute 
enhancing the sanctions of perpetrators of crimes against any specific raci al 
group may therefore fail to attain the goal of promoting equality of 
protection. Such legislation would be insensitive to the temporal and 
geographical diversity of racial prejudices. The attempt to protect only 
vulnerable groups is bound to fail in a di verse and dynamic society. Instead, 
such a society needs to use legislation that is flexible enough to 
accommodate varying prejudices and consequently better equipped to 
promote equality of protection in a changing environment. 
Moreover, the centrality of motives to bias crime highlights the societal 
concern for disparities in the vulnerability of victims that are attributable to 
race or sexual orientation, but not disparities in the vulnerability of victi ms 
that are attributable to other factors such as wealth inequality. Bias crime 
legislation is intended to cancel out only certain disparities in the 
vulnerability of different victims: those that are attributable to race, 
religion, or sexual orientation. It is not intended to annul disparities in 
vulnerability that are not attributable to these factors. Consequently, bias 
crime legislation must employ motivation in order to address the disparities 
that it intends to annul. 
This explanation raises an additional problem. Arguably, our model 
requires the state to prevent crimes that are attributable to race, religion, or 
sexual orientation, but not those that are attributable to other factors such as 
poverty. 
This objection requires investigation. Identifying all the cases that 
justify intervention on the part of the state is beyond the scope of this 
Essay. But it must be acknowledged that there are limits to the degree to 
which the legal system could provide equal protection against crime. All we 
claim is that such intervention is justified when increased vulnerability 
stems from a certain personal characteristic of the victim, such as race, 
gender, religion or sexual orientation. While bias crime legislation reduces 
the disparity in vulnerability to crime, it does not eliminate it altogether. It 
is possible that bias c1ime legislation is insufficient and that further efforts 
should be made to reduce other unjustifiable disparities in vulnerability to 
cnme. 
One can claim, of course, that differences in vulnerability to crime 
resulting from wealth disparities should also be eliminated. We do not deny 
this claim. Our Essay does not aim at exploring all the di sparities that may 
justify state intervention. But even if one is convinced that the disparity in 
vulnerability to crime that stems from wealth inequality should be 
remedied, it is not necessarily the case that the best way to achieve this goal 
is by enhancing the sanctions on crimes directed at the poor. 
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There are two primary ways in which the state can remedy inequality in 
the vulnerability of different victims. First, the state can remedy such 
inequality by differentiating the sanctions imposed on the perpetrators of 
crimes on the basis of the identity of their vict:irns. Pecpetrators who attack 
more vulnerable victims could be subjected to harsher sanctions. Second , 
the state could vary its enforcement efforts in accordance with the identity 
of the victim. [f this option is accepted , offenders who attack more 
vulnerable victims would face a higher probability of detection because of 
the differential efforts of the law-enforcement authorities. 
The choice between these two strategies depends on various factors. It 
is relatively easy to remedy differential vulnerability attributable to wealth 
inequality by increasing enforcement efforts. Increased police presence in 
poor neighborhoods may constitute a more effective way to deter criminal 
activity than enhanced sanctions on crimes directed at poor victims. It is 
virtually impossible, however, to employ the same strategy when inequality 
in vulnerability to crime is attributable to racial fac tors. It would be futile 
on the part of the police to invest resources in detecting perpetrators of bias 
crimes, because it is only after the perpetrator of the crime is detected that 
one can discern her motives clearly. Thus, in the context of bias crime it is 
easier and more efficient to use differential sanctions than differential 
enforcement efforts to reduce disparity in victims' vulnerability. 
Admittedly, these are tentative thoughts. Their purpose is not to show 
that disparities in the vulnerability of different victims attributable to racial 
factors should be reduced by differentiating sanctions, while disparities in 
the vulnerabilities of different victims attributable to wealth inequality 
should be reduced by differentiating enforcement efforts. The only purpose 
of these reflections is to show that disparities in the vulnerabilities of 
different victims may be remedied in different ways. Certain disparities 
may be remedied more effectively by differentiating criminal sanctions, 
while others may be addressed more efficiently by differentiating 
enforcement efforts. 
Finally, we would like to address two objections that challenge not the 
fair protection paradigm itself or its application to bias crimes, but rather 
the way in which such a concern should be imported into the legal system. 
Arguably, enhanced sentencing for bias crimes should be implemented 
through the Sentencing Guidelines rather than through the criminal law. In 
Section II.B, we discussed the provisions enhancing the sanctions imposed 
for crimes directed against victims who are particular! y susceptible to 
criminal conduct. Those provisions were interpreted as another example 
demonstrating the concern of the legal system to provide equal protection. 
Yet those provisions are part of the Sentencing Guidelines rather than the 
criminal law. Why is it that, in the case of bias crimes, the enhancement of 
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sanct ions is achieved through special provisions of the criminal LPN rather 
than through the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines'/ 
In order to address thi s question fully, one would need to develop a 
theory of the conceptual difference between enhancement of sanctions 
through the criminal law and enhancement of sanctions through the 
sentencing guidelines. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to provide such a 
theory. Yet one justification for the cunent practice is to highlight the 
commitment of the legal system to equal protection. Crimina l law is a much 
more pol itically visible scheme of regulation. Enhancing sanctions through 
the criminal law, therefore, guarantees greater visibility of equal protection 
concerns .78 
F inally, one might argue that the disparity in the vulnerability of 
potential victims attributable directly to racial hatred is not important 
enough to justify state intervention. After all, bias crimes constitute only a 
tiny fract ion of the criminal activity in the Uni ted States. Blacks are clearly 
more vu lnerable to crime than whites, bu t their greater vulnerability cannot 
be attributed only to bias crimes. The effect of bias crimes on the 
vul nerability of blacks is small relative to the effect that the disparity in 
wealth has on their vulnerability to crime. 
While it is probably true that poverty affects vulnerability to crime 
more than any racial or other fac tor, this does not suggest that other sources 
of vulnerability should be overlooked, or even left untouched, until the 
problem of wealth inequality is addressed. The liberal state has a special 
commitment to reducing vulnerable victims' exposure to crime , and bias 
crime legislation may be a good way of achiev ing equality. The special 
obligation of the state to provide protection is governed by principles of 
equality. Bias crime legislation is simply an expression of the greater duty 
of the state to protect its vulnerable members. 
CONCLUSION 
By presenting and exploring the contours of the fair protection 
paradigm, this Essay seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it attempts to 
provide a sorely lacking theoretical justification for bias crime legislation. 
Second, it tries to demonstrate that bias crime legislation is congruous with 
other contemporary practices of the criminal law. Thi s Essay argues, 
contrary to prevailing theories, that the wrongfulness of the criminal act and 
the culpability of the criminal perpetrator are not necessarily the only two 
factors that should determine the content of criminal prohibitions and the 
78. This argument sugges ts that perhaps the pro visions protecting victims who are 
particularl y susceptible to crim inal conduct should be part of the criminal law rather than the 
Sentenc ing Guidel ines . 
1999] On Hate and Equality 539 
sanctions imposed for their violation. To substantiate thi s claim, thi s Essay 
establishes an important connection between criminal law and theories of 
distributive justice. Perceiving the criminal law as a system for distributing 
protec ti on against crime has important descriptive and presc rip tive 
ramifications. Descriptively, it helps explain certain salie nt features of the 
criminal justice system. Prescriptively, it allows consideration of important 
societal concerns in determining the content o f the norms of the criminal 
law. Furthermore, it makes a demand upon the state to equali ze the 
protection the state provides to potential crime victims and to consider 
differe nces between individuals in determining law e nforcement and 
sentencing policies. To be sure, the fair protection paradigm needs to be 
further developed , and its contours require more precise delineation . The 
introduction of thi s principle in this Essay and its application to bias crimes 
constitute a first step in this direction . 
